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Pooling and Unpooling in the Uber Economy 
Daniel J. Hemel† 
In August 2014, the online transportation network Uber launched 
a new service named “UberPool,” which allows Uber users to share the 
cost of a car ride with strangers traveling along a similar route.1 In a 
blog post announcing UberPool, the company hailed the new service as 
“a bold social experiment” bringing the company and its customers into 
a “brave new world” of ridesharing.2 The blog post added that “the larger 
social implications of reducing the number of cars on the road, 
congestion in cities, pollution, [and] parking challenges” are “truly 
inspiring.”3 In the two years after the August 2014 launch, more than 
100 million UberPool rides were recorded, and UberPool came to 
account for approximately 20% of Uber trips.4 In that respect, Uber’s 
“bold social experiment” in pooling was a resounding success.5 
While Uber has successfully facilitated pooling among its millions 
of customers, it has done little to facilitate a different kind of pooling—
the pooling of risk—among the 400,000-plus drivers who compose its 
workforce.6 This article focuses on the pooling of five types of risk among 
workers: health risk, longevity risk, mortality risk, disability risk, and 
productivity risk. Millions of employees participate in workplace-based 
pooling arrangements that serve to insure them against risks of these 
types. Platforms such as Uber, however, have thus far failed to provide 
the same sort of pooling benefits to the workers on whose labor they rely 
This article examines the present state of workplace-based risk 
pooling in the age of Uber. Part I explains the basic problem of adverse 
† Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School; dhemel@uchicago.edu. 
 1 Announcing UberPool, UBER NEWSROOM (Aug. 5, 2014), https://newsroom.uber.com/an 
nouncing-uberpool [https://perma.cc/WHZ2-9SYV]. 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
 4 Get Ready to Share: UberPOOL Launches in Singapore, UBER NEWSROOM (June 29, 2016), 
https://newsroom.uber.com/singapore/get-ready-to-share-uberpool-launches-in-singapore [https:// 
perma.cc/L9LM-GBSF]. 
5 UBER NEWSROOM, supra note 1. 
 6 For the 400,000 driver figure, see New Survey: Drivers Choose Uber for Its Flexibility and 
Convenience, UBER NEWSROOM (Dec. 7, 2015), https://newsroom.uber.com/driver-partner-survey 
[https://perma.cc/3T3A-FKXL]. 
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selection in individual insurance markets. Mandatory pooling can 
mitigate adverse selection problems, though at the same time it gives 
rise to the related problem of moral hazard (i.e., the reduced incentive 
to guard against risk when one is shielded from the consequences). Part 
II describes the ways in which workplaces have served to pool particular 
risks, and then goes on to highlight the advantages and disadvantages 
of workplace-based risk pooling as against individual insurance 
markets. Part III provides an overview of economy-wide trends: while 
Uber and similar online platforms have contributed to “unpooling” (i.e., 
the individualization of risk) in specific sectors, a bird’s-eye view of the 
labor market makes clear that workplace-based risk pooling has always 
left a significant segment of the U.S. population unpooled. Part IV 
considers possible private-sector and public-sector responses to the 
problems that unpooling poses. 
I. ADVERSE SELECTION IN INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE MARKETS 
The problem of adverse selection in individual insurance markets 
is explained most easily by way of example. Imagine a population with 
two groups of equal sizes: the Eggshells and the Hardrocks. Let’s say 
that the Eggshells have expected accident costs of $50 and the 
Hardrocks have expected accident costs of $30. (We could replace 
accident costs with any other conceivably insurable expenses: 
healthcare costs, disability costs, etc.). Both the Eggshells and the 
Hardrocks are risk averse, and so both assign a higher value to 
insurance than their expected accident costs. To keep the math simple, 
we’ll assume that the value of insurance to any individual is 120% times 
expected accident costs, so the Eggshells would pay $60 for a policy that 
provides full coverage and the Hardrocks would pay $36 for the same 
policy. Assume for now that individuals know whether they are 
Eggshells or Hardrocks, but insurers either practically or legally cannot 
distinguish between the two types. 
What will happen if insurers offer full coverage policies at cost (i.e., 
no profit margin)? If the insurer can sell to Eggshells and Hardrocks in 
equal numbers, then the insurer might initially set the premium at $40 
(the average expected cost for members of the population). The 
Eggshells will purchase insurance because $60 > $40; the Hardrocks 
will not because $36 < $40. If all the Hardrocks drop out of the market, 
the insurer’s average expected cost for customers in the risk pool will be 
$50. Assuming no profit margin, insurers will then set premiums at 
$50; Eggshells will pay; and Hardrocks will not. A separating 
equilibrium emerges: even though individual riskiness is unobservable, 
the premium causes Eggshells and Hardrocks to divide themselves into 
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different groups, with the Eggshells purchasing insurance and the 
Hardrocks not. 
To appreciate the social costs of adverse selection, compare this 
separating equilibrium to a scenario in which Eggshells and Hardrocks 
remain in the same risk pool. If there are 50 Eggshells and 50 
Hardrocks, the social surplus (benefit minus cost) from insuring all 100 
individuals is equal to 50 x ($60 - $50) + 50 x ($36 - $30) = $800. In the 
separating equilibrium, only the Eggshells acquire insurance, and the 
social surplus is 50 x ($60 - $50) = $500. 
The example above is intended to show that a single risk pool 
encompassing Eggshells and Hardrocks can increase social welfare. 
One might also argue on distributional grounds that pooling is 
preferable to separating: behind the veil of ignorance, before we know 
whether we are Eggshells or Hardrocks, we would want to insure 
against the risk of being an Eggshell. Adverse selection raises the cost 
of premiums for the Eggshells, and thus increases the downside of 
losing the natural lottery.7 
We might imagine further iterations involving a menu of insurance 
contracts rather than a binary choice between full insurance and no 
insurance. A rich literature in economics explores the range of possible 
outcomes when insurance contracts of varying generosity are offered 
under conditions of asymmetric information.8 The conclusions of that 
literature defy easy summary, but a fair generalization is that 
individuals often go with suboptimal amounts of insurance absent some 
sort of subsidy.9 
The running example of the Eggshells and Hardrocks can serve to 
illustrate the efficiency of a subsidy. With a subsidy of any more than 
$4, Hardrocks will return to the insurance market. If all 50 Eggshells 
and all 50 Hardrocks purchase insurance, then the average cost to the 
insurer will be $40; the value of full coverage to Hardrocks is still $36; 
and the insurance offer plus subsidy is now attractive to the Hardrocks. 
Eggshells, of course, will remain in the market just as before. Another 
way to achieve the same objective might be to impose an insurance 
mandate: Eggshells and Hardrocks alike could be required to acquire 
 
 7 See David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, in 1 
FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH 1, 9–10 (Alan M. Garber ed., 1998). 
 8 The seminal paper on the subject is Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in 
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. 
ECON. 629 (1976) [hereinafter Equilbrium]. For a more recent analysis by the same authors, see 
Michael Rothschild & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Competition and Insurance Twenty Years Later, 22 
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. THEORY 73 (1997). 
 9 See Equilibrium, supra note 8, at 644. 
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coverage. Subsidies and mandates are not mutually exclusive: the 
Affordable Care Act is a familiar example of the two combined. 
While mandatory risk pooling would increase overall welfare and 
might be desirable on distributive justice grounds, it is not—at least in 
this case—Pareto-efficient: it makes Eggshells better off but Hardrocks 
worse off ($36 < $40). Note, moreover, that the example does not account 
for the problem of moral hazard. If individuals have some control over 
whether they become Eggshells or Hardrocks, then a single risk pool 
with a uniform premium might promote inefficient behavior because 
individuals incur less of a cost if they become Eggshells. So too, insured 
individuals will have less of an incentive to reduce their risk, and so we 
might expect a higher overall accident rate when all individuals are 
fully insured than when only the Eggshells are insured. 
For present purposes, the important points are (1) that under some 
conditions, unsubsidized individual insurance markets will leave 
significant segments of the population without coverage, and (2) that 
forcing high-risk and low-risk individuals into the same pool can be 
welfare-enhancing. The next section turns to ways in which workplace-
based risk pools accomplish that function. 
II. POOLING IN THE WORKPLACE 
This part focuses on specific risks commonly pooled among 
employees of a firm: health risk, longevity risk, mortality risk, disability 
risk, and productivity risk. Several themes run throughout. First, 
workplace-based risk pools benefit from government subsidies that are 
often unavailable to participants in individual insurance markets. 
Second, workplace-based risk pools sometimes (though not always) 
mitigate adverse selection problems by pushing high-risk and low-risk 
individuals into the same pools. Third, workplace-based risk pooling 
takes advantage of the division of labor, with human resource 
specialists aiding employees with enrollment and other insurance plan 
interactions. Fourth and relatedly, workplace-based pooling 
arrangements potentially reduce administrative costs through scale 
economies. Fifth and finally, firms sometimes (though again, not 
always) enjoy advantages over individual insurance providers in 
managing moral hazard. These advantages of workplace-based risk 
pooling are reflected in part by the high level of participation among 
large-firm employees. But the advantages of workplace-based risk 
pooling are not unqualified, and the analysis in this part notes some 
ways in which workplace-based risk pooling may be problematic. 
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A. Health Risk 
The model of the Eggshells and the Hardrocks in Part I is perhaps 
most applicable to the health insurance setting. The workplace serves 
as a potential site for the pooling of health risks across high-risk and 
low-risk individuals. First and foremost, federal income tax law 
provides a strong incentive for employees—regardless of their health 
status—to seek insurance through the workplace. An employer’s 
contribution to a health plan for an employee or the employee’s spouse, 
dependent, or child is excluded from gross income under section 106 of 
the Internal Revenue Code.10 Section 106 effectively subsidizes 
employer-provided health insurance in an amount equal to the product 
of the employer’s excluded payment and the employee’s marginal tax 
rate. To continue with the example from Part I of the Eggshells and the 
Hardrocks, imagine that both groups face a marginal tax rate of 25%. 
The Eggshells are indifferent between $80 in pre-tax wages and an 
insurance policy providing benefits that they value at $60; the 
Hardrocks are indifferent between $48 in pre-tax wages and an 
insurance policy providing benefits that they value at $36. If the 
employer gives employees the option of sacrificing $40 in pre-tax wages 
in exchange for health insurance coverage with no deductibles or 
copays, the Eggshells and the Hardrocks will both accept. 
The Affordable Care Act gives a further incentive for employers to 
offer health insurance to employees.11 The ACA added section 4980H to 
the Internal Revenue Code, which imposes an annual penalty of $2,000 
on employers with more than 50 full-time employees who fail to sponsor 
health insurance through the workplace if at least one of those 
employees enrolls in an ACA-subsidized plan.12 The combination of 
carrot and stick—a subsidy for employer-sponsored health insurance 
plans through section 106, and a penalty for failing to sponsor such a 
 
 10 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2012); 26 C.F.R 1.106-1(a). Note that self-employed individuals and 
individuals who are not eligible for employer-subsidized plans can claim an above-the-line income 
tax deduction for health insurance as well. 26 U.S.C. § 162(l) (2012); cf. 26 U.S.C. § 401(c) (2012) 
(defining “employee” for purposes of § 162(l) and other statutes to include self-employed 
individuals). An employee who opts out of employer-subsidized coverage and instead chooses to 
purchase insurance on the individual market would not be eligible for the deduction. Also, 
employer contributions to employee health insurance are excluded from the payroll tax base, see 
26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(2) (2012), whereas individuals (including self-employed individuals) who 
purchase insurance on the individual market cannot deduct premiums for payroll tax purposes. 
 11 The American Health Care Act proposed by House Republican leaders in early March 2017 
has the potential to reverse the incentive so that employees are better off in after-tax terms if their 
employers do not offer health insurance. See Daniel Hemel, The House GOP Plan and Employer-
Sponsored Health Insurance: Killing It Softly?, WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://bit.ly/2mRPCOt [http://perma.cc/H8RX-9JLH]; cf. American Health Care Reform Act of 
2017, H.R. 277, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 12 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012). 
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plan under section 4980H13—has resulted in virtually all large 
employers offering health insurance to employees. In one 2015 survey, 
99% of large firms (50 employees or more) reported that they offer 
health insurance to full-time employees.14 
Beyond the subsidies for participation and the penalties for opting 
out, there are at least four more reasons why employees might choose 
to participate in workplace-based health risk pools rather than 
acquiring health insurance on the individual market. First, adverse 
selection may be less severe because employees match with employers 
based on a number of factors other than health insurance. In the 
individual market, we might expect to see high-risk individuals select 
into (and low-risk individuals select out of ) generous health plans; we 
might think it less likely that high-risk and low-risk individuals will 
sort across workplaces based on the generosity of employee health 
benefits. Second, many individuals lack the time or the background 
knowledge to navigate a complex web of health insurance options; 
delegating decisionmaking to a human resource specialist can serve as 
a way to pool cognitive costs.15 Third, costs for sales, marketing, brokers’ 
fees, and other administrative expenses are significantly lower in the 
large-employer market than in the individual market: unsurprisingly, 
the cost incurred by an insurer in selling a policy to a 50-employee firm 
is well below the cost of selling individual policies to each of the 50 
employees.16 Fourth, and finally, we might expect that employers, who 
already observe employees on a regular basis, enjoy an absolute 
 
 13 The Affordable Care Act applied a similar carrot-and-stick approach to support the 
individual health insurance market. For the carrots, the ACA provides subsidies to help low- and 
moderate-income households purchase insurance on the individual market, see 26 U.S.C. § 36B 
(2012), as well as subsidies for insurers that cover low- and moderate-income households, see 42 
U.S.C. § 18071 (2012). For the stick, the ACA’s individual mandate imposes a requirement to 
maintain minimum health insurance coverage, with a penalty for noncompliance of $695 or 2.5% 
of income (whichever is greater). See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). Early evidence suggests that 
adverse selection has remained a significant problem in the individual health insurance market 
notwithstanding the ACA’s positive and negative incentives for health individuals to enroll. See 
Newly Enrolled Members in the Individual Health Insurance Market After Health Care Reform: 
The Experience from 2014 and 2015, BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD (Mar. 20, 2016), https:// 
www.bcbs.com/about-us/capabilities-initiatives/health-america/health-of-america-report/newly-
enrolled-members [https://perma.cc/32MP-UYDH]; see also Matthew Panhans, Adverse Selection 
in ACA Exchange Markets: Evidence from Colorado (Dec. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920049 [https://perma.cc/6TG2-TWA3]. 
 14 TRANSAMERICA CTR. FOR HEALTH STUDIES, TRANSAMERICA CENTER FOR HEALTH STUDIES 
SURVEY: COMPANIES NAVIGATE THE HEALTH COVERAGE MANDATE 11 (Dec. 2015). 
 15 On the inability of individuals to make rational health insurance choices, see Saurabh 
Bhargava et al., Do Individuals Make Sensible Health Insurance Decisions? Evidence from a Menu 
with Dominated Options (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 21160, May 2015), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21160 [https://perma.cc/N7HF-NG4H]. 
 16 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND FEDERAL POLICY 
36 tbl.A-1 (Feb. 2016). 
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advantage vis-à-vis insurers when it comes to managing moral 
hazard.17 
Before concluding that all is well with workplace-based health risk 
pooling, four caveats are in order. First, the 99% figure for full-time 
employees at large firms does not mean that all workers have the option 
of enrolling in health insurance through their workplace: coverage rates 
are considerably lower for part-time employees and employees of 
smaller firms.18 Second, a rapidly rising percentage of covered workers 
are enrolled in plans with an annual deductible of $1,000 or more.19 In 
many cases, workers with employer-sponsored health insurance are 
receiving less comprehensive coverage than they were a few years ago 
(though whether the spread of high-deductible policies increases or 
decreases welfare is difficult to determine).20 Third, most employers 
that sponsor health insurance for their employees offer a choice among 
multiple plans.21 While more choice might sound like an unmitigated 
good, such choice can also reproduce the adverse selection problem at 
the workplace level: employees who know they are sick opt into the 
more generous plans; employees who know they are healthy opt into the 
less expensive, high deductible plans; and the separation that might be 
anticipated in the individual market is replicated in the large group 
market.22 Fourth and finally, workplace-based pooling of health risk 
may lead to “job lock,” with workers failing to make productivity-
 
 17 The experience thus far with workplace-based wellness programs, however, has not given 
us much reason to believe that employer interventions can significantly improve employee health. 
See SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., RAND INST., WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY FINAL REPORT 
(2013), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR254.readonline.html [https://perma.cc/YK 
9J-D9SD]. 
 18 The Transamerica survey reports that 30% of firms with 500 or more employees offer health 
insurance to part-time employees; that figure drops to 26% for firms with 50 to 499 employees and 
8% for firms with fewer than 50 employees. Meanwhile, 61% of firms with fewer than 50 employees 
report that they offer health insurance to full-time employees. See TRANSAMERICA CTR. FOR 
HEALTH STUDIES, supra note 14. 
 19 In 2006, 10% of covered workers were enrolled in these high deductible plans. By 2015, the 
figure had increased to 46%. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL 
TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2015 ANNUAL SURVEY 5 (2015), http://files.kff.org/ 
attachment/report-2015-employer-health-benefits-survey [https://perma.cc/A42M-Z7T4]. 
 20 The literature on the welfare effects of insurance deductibles is voluminous. One seminal 
contribution is Kenneth J. Arrow, Optimal Insurance and Generalized Deductibles, 1974 SCAND. 
ACTUARIAL J. 1. 
 21 According to a 2015 survey by the Federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 
approximately 50.2% of private-sector firms that sponsor health insurance for their employees 
offer two or more plan options. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, MEDICAL 
EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY tbl.I.A.2.d (2015), https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/ 
insr/national/series_1/2015/tia2d.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RUW-RTDB]. 
 22 For a case study illustrating the phenomenon of within-firm adverse selection among 
Harvard University employees, see David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, Paying for Health 
Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition and Adverse Selection, 113 Q.J. ECON. 433 (1998). 
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improving job switches because they are worried about leaving their 
existing health insurance plans and provider networks.23 
To sum up so far: workplaces have emerged as the primary sites for 
the pooling of health risks outside of Medicare and Medicaid. This fact 
can be attributed to tax incentives for employer-sponsored health 
insurance, penalties under the Affordable Care Act for large employers 
that fail to provide coverage, and certain structural features that make 
it generally easier and cheaper for workers to procure health insurance 
coverage through their employers rather than on the individual market. 
But millions of Americans have been left outside workplace-based 
health risk pools, and workplace-based health risk pooling carries social 
costs as well as benefits. 
B. Longevity Risk 
The notion of insuring against the risk of longevity might seem 
strange on first glance, since most of us think of long life as a blessing 
than a risk.24 But the risk of outliving one’s savings is a real one—and 
one that it is difficult to insure against on the individual market. In 
theory, individuals can insure against longevity risk by purchasing 
annuities that guarantee monthly payments for the rest of their lives. 
In practice, however, the same adverse selection problems that we 
might expect to see in the individual health insurance market plague 
the annuity market as well.25 Here, the roles of the Eggshells and the 
Hardrocks are reversed: it is the healthy, long-lived individuals who are 
costlier to insure, and the frailer, shorter-lived individuals who drop out 
of the market. 
In an insightful 1990 paper, Zvi Bodie argued that “[e]mployer 
pension plans offer a way of overcoming the adverse selection problem” 
in the annuity market.26 Employers can accomplish this, according to 
Bodie, “[b]y making participation in the plan mandatory and offering 
life annuities as the only payout option.”27 At the time of Bodie’s article, 
“defined benefit” pension plans, which approximate employer-provided 
annuities, were the most common arrangement among U.S. employees 
 
 23 On employer-based health insurance and job lock, see Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance 
and the Labor Market, 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 645, 654–58 (A.J. Cuyler & J.P. 
Newhouse eds., 2000). 
 24 But see NATALIE BABBITT, TUCK EVERLASTING (1975). 
 25 See Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: 
Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market, 112 J. POL. ECON. 183 (2004); see generally 
Benjamin M. Friedman & Mark J. Warshawsky, The Cost of Annuities: Implications for Saving 
Behavior and Bequests, 105 Q.J. ECON. 135 (1990). 
 26 Zvi Bodie, Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 28, 35 (1990). 
 27 Id. 
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covered by workplace-based pension plans.28 By requiring employees to 
participate in such plans, employers could ensure that the longevity 
risk pool remained representative of the workforce as a whole rather 
than being dominated by longer lived (and thus costlier-to-insure) 
individuals. 
Over the last three and a half decades, however, we have witnessed 
a dramatic decline in defined benefit pension plan participation and a 
corresponding shift toward defined contribution plans.29 The causes of 
this shift are complicated. Legal and regulatory changes no doubt 
played an important role. The Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA)30 and the Revenue Act of 197831 created individual 
retirement arrangements (IRAs) and defined contribution 401(k) plans, 
respectively; these vehicles allow workers to gain the advantage of tax 
deferral without participating in a defined benefit plan.32 But while the 
emergence of IRAs and defined contribution 401(k) plans may have 
been a necessary condition for the shift, the availability of these 
alternatives was not a sufficient condition: the tax deferral advantages 
of IRAs and defined contribution 401(k) plans are in some cases similar 
to—and in other cases less generous than—the tax deferral advantages 
of defined benefit pension plans.33 
 
 28 See id. at 30 n.5 (citing TRENDS IN PENSIONS tbl.4.6 (John A. Turner & Daniel J. Beller eds., 
1989)). 
 29 For an overview, see James M. Poterba et al., The Decline of Defined Benefit Retirement 
Plans and Asset Flows, in SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 333 (Jeffrey 
Brown et al. eds., 2009). 
 30 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
 31 Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.). 
 32 26 U.S.C. § 408 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2012). 
 33 In a defined benefit plan, the employer makes annual contributions such that the plan can 
meet its defined benefit obligations, given certain actuarial assumptions. For 2017, the maximum 
benefit is the lesser of (a) 100% of the participant’s average compensation for her highest three 
consecutive calendar years, or (b) $215,000 (with the latter amount to be adjusted in future years 
for changes in the cost of living). See 26 U.S.C. § 415(b) (2012); Retirement Topics—Defined Benefit 
Plan Benefit Limits, IRS (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participant-
employee/retirement-topics-defined-benefit-plan-benefit-limits [https://perma.cc/S6VL-LF65]. 
For workers with high peak-year compensation, the allowable contribution to a defined 
benefit plan will likely exceed the $18,000 cap for defined contribution 401(k) plans (or $24,000 for 
workers 50 and over making catch-up contributions). See Retirement Topics - 401(k) and Profit-
Sharing Plan Contribution Limits, IRS (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-
participant-employee/retirement-topics-401k-and-profit-sharing-plan-contribution-limits [https:// 
perma.cc/HGF7-ZVGA]; see generally Paul Sullivan, Save for Retirement in Just 10 Years? It’s 
Doable, But Risky, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/your-money/ 
defined-benefit-plans-allow-fast-retirement-saving-but-with-risks.html [https://perma.cc/NB9V-
WL7A] (noting that the allowable contribution to a defined benefit plan for a highly compensated 
worker in her 50s could potentially exceed $250,000 a year). For a younger, lower-wage worker, 
the defined contribution 401(k) cap may be higher than the defined benefit cap. 
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Edward Zelinsky notes several additional changes in the legal 
landscape that may have accelerated the shift away from defined 
benefit plans.34 Among others: ERISA imposed intricate “minimum 
funding” rules that applied to sponsors of defined benefit but not defined 
contribution plans,35 and imposed federal fiduciary standards on 
employers that are easier to satisfy with respect to defined contribution 
plans than defined benefit plans.36 Broader labor market trends, 
including the decline of unions and increasing employee mobility, may 
have reinforced ERISA’s effects.37 
Whatever the causes, the consequences of the shift away from 
defined benefit pensions and toward a “defined contribution paradigm” 
are stark. The share of private sector workers participating in defined 
benefit plans has fallen from 38% in 1979 to 13% in 2013, while the 
share participating in defined contribution plans has risen from 17% to 
44%.38 While the share of private sector workers covered by any 
employee pension plan has remained relatively constant over that 
period (45% in 1979, 46% in 2013),39 the extent to which workplaces 
serve as sites of longevity risk pooling has decreased drastically. 
C. Mortality Risk 
The flip side of longevity risk (the risk of outliving one’s retirement 
savings) is mortality risk (the risk of dying before retirement). A 
breadwinner’s death during peak earning years results in a negative 
shock to household income. A worker who wants to guarantee a smooth 
consumption path for her spouse, children, or other dependents may 
therefore want to acquire insurance against mortality risk (i.e., life 
insurance). 
One might expect to see adverse selection in the individual life 
insurance market just as one sees adverse selection in the individual 
annuity market. If individuals who expect to live shorter lives select out 
of the annuity market, then those same individuals will select into the 
life insurance market—or so we might anticipate. Consistent with this 
expectation, Daifeng He finds that individuals who purchase life 
 
 34 See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 471–81 
(2004). 
 35 See 26 U.S.C. § 412 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081–1086 (2012); Zelinsky, supra note 34, at 475. 
 36 See Zelinsky, supra note 34, at 478–79. 
 37 Id. at 480–81. 
 38 FAQs About Benefits—Retirement Issues, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., https:// 
www.ebri.org/publications/benfaq/index.cfm?fa=retfaq14 [https://perma.cc/YKQ7-V2D4] (last vis-
ited Dec. 22, 2016). 
 39 Id. 
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insurance in the United States die sooner than the general population 
after controlling for variables that are generally observable to insurers 
(specifically, age, gender, smoking status, health status, medical 
history, and family history).40 The results of He’s study suggest that 
individuals with private information about their own life expectancy 
select into and out of life insurance on the basis of that information.41 
While adverse selection problems place limits on the pooling of 
mortality risk in the individual life insurance market, quite a bit of 
mortality risk pooling occurs in the workplace. In 2013, group life 
insurance accounted for approximately 32% of total death payments by 
U.S. life insurers42 and 42% of all life insurance in the United States by 
face amount,43 though less than 21% of net premium receipts.44 Not all 
group life insurance is employer-based: some unions and professional 
associations offer group life insurance as well.45 Overall, though, 
employer-based group life insurance is quite common, with 
approximately 72% of full-time workers in the United States having 
access to life insurance through their employers in 2014 and 71% 
participating in employer-based life insurance.46 
Federal tax law strongly incentivizes employers to provide term life 
insurance coverage of up to $50,000 for employees; employer-paid 
premiums up to that coverage cap are excluded from the employee’s 
gross income for federal income tax and payroll tax purposes.47 (Note 
that life insurance death benefits are also excluded from income under 
section 101.48) In dollar terms, the tax expenditure for employer-
provided group term life insurance is tiny in comparison to the 
expenditure for employer-sponsored health insurance,49 but the 
economics are similar: in both cases, federal tax law effectively 
subsidizes workplace-based risk pooling such that even low-risk 
workers find it worthwhile to participate. 
 
 40 Daifeng He, The Life Insurance Market: Asymmetric Information Revisited, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 
1090, 1093–95 (2009). 
 41 Id. at 1095. 
 42 AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, 2014 LIFE INSURERS FACTBOOK 47 (2014). 
 43 Id. at 66 tbl.7.1. 
 44 Id. at 38 tbl.4.3. 
 45 Id. at 65. 
 46 GEN RE, LIFE & HEALTH FACT BOOK, 2015–2016, at 51 (2014). Among part-time workers, 
13% had access to life insurance through their employers and 11% participated. Id. 
 47 26 U.S.C. § 79(a) (2012). 
 48 26 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 49 For the 2017 fiscal year, the Treasury Department estimates that the tax expenditure for 
employer-sponsored health insurance will be $222 billion, compared to $2.58 billion for employer-
provided group term life insurance. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, TAX 
EXPENDITURES 34 tbl.3 (Sept. 28, 2016). 
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D. Disability Risk 
Disability risk might be considered a subspecies of health risk (see 
Section II.A above) or productivity risk (see Section II.E below); it is, in 
any event, a type of risk for which individual insurance markets are 
vulnerable to adverse selection (as well as moral hazard). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, private disability insurance in the United States is 
primarily procured through the group rather than individual market: 
measured by premiums paid, group insurance accounted for more than 
three-quarters of the U.S. disability insurance market in 2013.50 
Coverage rates vary dramatically across sector, with participation 
exceeding 50% among managerial and professional workers and below 
20% among service sector workers. Overall, the share of full-time 
workers participating in workplace-based disability insurance in 2013 
was 48% for short-term disability coverage and 43% for long-term 
disability coverage. The comparable figures for part-time workers were 
13% (short-term) and 11% (long-term).51 
Federal income tax law encourages employer-based disability 
insurance, though not in a straightforward way. Employer-paid 
disability insurance premiums are excludable from the employee’s gross 
income, though with the consequence that future disability benefits are 
fully taxable.52 However, disability is generally associated with a drop 
in income, and so the disabled beneficiary’s marginal income tax rate at 
the time of inclusion is likely lower than the employee’s marginal 
income tax rate at the time of exclusion. In this respect, disability 
insurance provided by an employer allows insured employees to shift 
taxable income from higher bracket years to lower bracket years. 
Thus, as in the cases of health risk and mortality risk, workplaces 
serve as sites for the pooling of disability risk. As in the health and 
mortality risk cases, this phenomenon may be partially attributable to 
the advantage of workplace-based risk pooling as an antidote to adverse 
selection: we might expect that workers will be less likely to match with 
employers on the basis of disability risk than that they might select 
among disability insurance policies on the individual market on the 
basis of private information. And as in the health and mortality risk 
cases, the prevalence of workplace-based disability risk pooling may be 
partially attributable to incentives provided by the tax code. The key 
 
 50 GEN RE, LIFE & HEALTH FACT BOOK, 2015-2016, supra note 46, at 61–62. 
 51 Id. at 50–51. 
 52 See IRS, LIFE INSURANCE & DISABILITY INSURANCE PROCEEDS, https://www.irs.gov/help-
resources/tools-faqs/faqs-for-individuals/frequently-asked-tax-questions-answers/interest-dividen 
ds-other-types-of-income/life-insurance-disability-insurance-proceeds/life-insurance-disability-ins 
urance-proceeds-1 [https://perma.cc/D8X8-5EK8] (last updated Jan. 1, 2016). 
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point for present purposes is that workers who do not obtain disability 
insurance through their employers are likely to encounter greater 
obstacles (and higher costs) in trying to obtain such insurance on the 
individual market. 
E. Productivity Risk 
Productivity risk refers to the risk that a worker’s marginal product 
of labor will drop unexpectedly. A worker may turn out to be less 
productive than anticipated on a particular day because of a migraine 
headache, or less productive for a week because of the flu, or less 
productive for a year because of a time-consuming and distracting 
divorce. She may find that her particular skill is less valuable because 
of a macroeconomic swing (e.g., the bankruptcy lawyer in boom time, or 
the mergers and acquisitions lawyer in a downturn). Or her particular 
site might attract less traffic because of events beyond her control (e.g., 
the barista at a specific Starbucks location may see her productivity 
decline when the metro stop next to her café closes temporarily for 
renovation). 
In some cases, the worker may be able to purchase insurance so 
that negative shocks to her productivity do not affect her consumption. 
(The mergers and acquisitions lawyer, for example, might short the 
S&P 500.) In many other cases, however, such insurance will be 
impossible to procure. Premiums may be prohibitively high on account 
of moral hazard. For example, the worker may be less likely to get a flu 
shot if she knows that she is protected against the negative productivity 
shock from losing a week of work, and the insurer—knowing this as 
well—will be less willing to provide coverage unless at a steeper price. 
Adverse selection may push premiums higher still. For example, 
workers who know that they are migraine-prone will be more likely to 
buy headache insurance; insurers, knowing that, will raise their prices; 
only the most migraine-prone workers will be willing to insure at the 
higher price; and so on. 
Firms enjoy two significant advantages over individual insurance 
markets with regard to productivity risk pooling across workers. First, 
managers monitor workers who are in close proximity (and co-workers 
in close proximity monitor each other). In theory, an insurer providing 
productivity insurance to a particular worker could try to police 
shirking via site visits and video monitoring, but the manager has 
obvious advantages over the insurer (e.g., greater familiarity with the 
requirements of the job and the factors that might influence 
productivity, and scale-economy and specialization advantages from 
monitoring all of the workers at a specific site rather than a small 
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number of workers at one site and a small number at another).53 
Second, workplace-based productivity risk pools might be less 
vulnerable to adverse selection than an individual insurance market 
would be. I might accept a job when I think that I will underperform 
expectations and earn a wage that exceeds the marginal product of my 
labor,54 but I also might accept a job when I think that I will outperform 
expectations and rise through the firm’s ranks. 
Workplaces are sites at which workers pool productivity risk. The 
criterion for productivity risk pooling is that compensation varies less 
than the marginal product of labor. This generally will be true when 
workers receive a fixed wage or salary (even when they also earn 
commissions, tips, or bonuses). It may also be true when workers are 
compensated on the basis of firm-level profitability rather than 
personal performance (e.g., partners at a law firm with a lock-step 
compensation structure).55 
Federal tax law encourages the pooling of productivity risk across 
workers. The federal income tax code is progressive: rates rise as 
taxable income increases. This feature of the tax code generates an 
incentive for workers to smooth income across years. For example, 
Person A, an unmarried individual with taxable income of $100,000 one 
year and $100,000 the next, will pay less in federal income taxes than 
Person B, an unmarried individual with taxable income of $120,000 one 
year and $80,000 the next.56 Note that even if Person B could purchase 
productivity insurance on the individual market, she would still bear a 
tax cost from income volatility.57 
Note also that even when workplaces facilitate the pooling of 
productivity risk, workers are still exposed to employment risk. A 
worker with a fixed wage whose productivity declines might not 
experience an immediate decline in income, but she is more likely to 
lose her job. In this respect, the pooling of productivity risk at the firm 
 
 53 Firms might also be able to take steps that reduce the risk of negative productivity shocks 
(e.g., on-site flu vaccination clinics). 
 54 A note to my dean: I of course did not think this when I accepted an assistant professorship 
at the University of Chicago Law School. 
 55 For information on productivity risk pooling at law firms, see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. 
Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law 
Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985). 
 56 For information on income volatility and its costs for low-income workers, see generally Lily 
L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEG. 395 (2003). 
 57 If amounts received under productivity insurance plans were treated like amounts received 
under accident and health plans, then Person B’s premiums would not be tax deductible and 
payouts would not be included in gross income. See 26 U.S.C. 105 (2012). The tax consequences 
would be the same as if she did not have productivity insurance (i.e., she would face an effective 
penalty for income volatility). 
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level exposes workers to even more employment risk. Consider that if 
wages were to vary with the marginal product of labor, then a worker 
whose productivity declined would see her wage decline but her 
employer would have no incentive to lay her off. If wages are sticky, 
however, employers will have an incentive to fire workers when the 
marginal product of the worker’s labor drops below the worker’s wage.58 
This last point suggests that if income smoothing is the objective, 
pooling of productivity risk at the firm level is not an unmitigated good. 
Indeed, it is not entirely clear whether firm-level pooling of productivity 
risk leads to more or less income volatility overall: as a result of firm-
level pooling, an individual worker will be exposed to less of an income 
shock when she experiences a productivity decline and keeps her job, 
but more of an income shock when she experiences a productivity 
decline and loses her job. Remember that in the absence of firm-level 
pooling, the productivity decline would likely not lead to job loss; it 
would instead lead to a decline in compensation. This analysis suggests 
that even though the workplace can function as a site of productivity 
risk pooling, the workplace is not necessarily the optimal site for such 
pooling. 
F. Pools of Pools 
Analyzing each of these five risks separately—health risk, 
longevity risk, mortality risk, disability risk, and productivity risk—
arguably understates the overall advantage of workplace-based risk 
pooling. Workplace-based pooling of multiple risks frees employees 
from the burden of shopping for several different types of insurance 
policies: within the setting of a large firm, employees can rely on human 
resource specialists to guide them through a maze of insurance options. 
Not only can this economize on cognitive costs for employees, it can also 
lead to administrative cost savings because insurance is procured 
through a small number of transactions between employer and insurer 
rather than a larger number of transactions involving individual 
employees. Workplace-based risk pooling also introduces an element of 
“collective bargaining”: not collective bargaining in the traditional sense 
between employees and employer, but bargaining between employer 
and insurer with the employer acting on employees’ behalf. Employers 
 
 58 See Hamish Low et al., Wage Risk and Employment Risk over the Life Cycle, 100 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1432, 1433 (2010) (“In a fully competitive labor market with no worker-firm match 
heterogeneity and no search costs, the distinction between employment and productivity risk 
would be meaningless because unemployment would arise only due to low productivity resulting 
in the individual’s market wage being below the reservation wage. Unemployment itself would not 
be a source of risk.”). 
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procuring insurance on the group market may enjoy bargaining power 
advantages unavailable to any individual. So too, the bundling of 
insurance policies at the workplace level may mitigate adverse selection 
problems insofar as certain cross-subsidies offset each other. For 
example, the same worker may be a Hardrock with respect to health 
risk but an Eggshell with respect to longevity risk (or vice versa). All of 
this is to suggest that when it comes to risk pooling, there may be 
economies of scope as well as scale. 
III. UNPOOLING IN THE UBER ECONOMY 
As emphasized in Part II, workplaces potentially serve as sites for 
the pooling of health risk, longevity risk, mortality risk, disability risk, 
and productivity risk. None of this pooling occurs, however, among 
workers in the so-called “gig economy.”59 The Uber experience offers a 
stark illustration. While Uber offers drivers the benefits of flexibility 
and autonomy,60 it does not offer health insurance, pension benefits, life 
insurance, or disability insurance (although it has partnered with other 
providers to make it easier for drivers to enroll in health insurance and 
set up an IRA).61 And Uber does little to insure drivers against 
productivity risk: a driver’s income can vary dramatically depending on 
the number of passengers she picks up, whether “surge pricing” is in 
effect,62 the price of gasoline, and a range of other factors.63 
But while Uber illustrates the unpooling phenomenon, Uber and 
other gig economy platforms play only a small role in unpooling on an 
economy-wide basis. Much of what we know about the size of the gig 
economy comes from Census Bureau statistics on “nonemployer firms,” 
businesses with no paid employees.64 An Uber driver operating as a sole 
 
 59 See generally Christina Farr, Who’s Responsible for Your Uber Driver’s Health Coverage?, 
NPR (Oct. 11, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/10/11/447157698/who-s-resp 
onsible-for-your-uber-driver-s-health-coverage [https://perma.cc/2AUL-5ZJ4]. 
 60 Or so the company claims. See New Survey: Drivers Choose Uber for Its Flexibility and 
Convenience, UBER NEWSROOM (Dec. 7, 2015), https://newsroom.uber.com/driver-partner-survey 
[https://perma.cc/5M3L-LKG7]. 
 61 See Heather Long, Uber Tests Program To Help Drivers Save for Retirement, CNN MONEY 
(Aug. 24, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/24/investing/uber-save-for-retirement-betterment 
[https://perma.cc/N6B6-N7CK]. 
 62 On surge pricing, see M. Keith Chen & Michael Sheldon, Dynamic Pricing in a Labor 
Market: Surge Pricing and Flexible Work on the Uber Platform (Dec. 21, 2015) (unpublished 
paper). 
 63 On income volatility in the gig economy, see Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy, 
Workers Find Both Freedom and Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2014/08/17/technology/in-the-sharing-economy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty.h 
tml [https://perma.cc/NY9U-8SHM]. 
 64 Ian Hathaway & Mark Muro, Tracking the Gig Economy: New Numbers, BROOKINGS INST. 
(Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-the-gig-economy-new-numbers 
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proprietor or through an S corporation or limited liability company 
would constitute one nonemployer firm, as would a homeowner who 
earns income by renting out spare rooms on Airbnb. The ranks of 
nonemployer firms also include, however, many workers outside the gig 
economy, ranging from doctors and lawyers in solo practice to hot dog 
stand proprietors and private piano teachers. 
In 1997, there were 8.3 payroll employees per nonemployer firm in 
the United States.65 By 2014, the ratio of payroll employees to 
nonemployer firms had fallen to 6.1-to-1. In certain sectors, the change 
was more dramatic: for instance, the ratio of payroll employees to 
nonemployer firms fell by more than 40% in some segments of the 
passenger ground transportation industry. And yet of the 9 million 
nonemployer firms that have emerged since 1997, the passenger ground 
transportation industry accounts for only about 200,000.66 Uber and 
Lyft illustrate the growth of the nonemployer economy, but they hardly 
explain that growth on their own. 
Unpooling, moreover, is not merely a phenomenon among the self-
employed. Most workers are not enrolled in workplace-based short-term 
or long-term disability insurance; almost half are not enrolled in 
workplace-based life insurance;67 and only a small sliver are still 
enrolled in workplace-based defined benefit pension plans.68 Even at its 
peak, defined benefit plans covered less than half of private sector 
workers in the United States.69 The promise of workplace-based risk 
pooling was never fully realized even in the pre-Uber economy. And so 
in analyzing the future of workplace-based risk pooling, it is important 
 
[https://perma.cc/GGT9-GS4K]. 
 65 That does not mean one in every 9.3 workers was self-employed, however, as some workers 
were full-time or part-time employees of a multiemployee establishment while operating a 
nonemployer firm on the side. 
 66 Hathaway & Muro, supra note 64. The increase of 200,000 might seem small given that 
Uber alone had added more than 160,000 drivers by the end of 2014. See Jonathan V. Hall & Alan 
B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States (Jan. 
22, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The University of Chicago Legal Forum). Note, 
though, that Uber’s rise has come at the same time as a fall in the number of taxi drivers in many 
U.S. cities, and the drivers potentially displaced by Uber operated as nonemployer firms as well. 
See, e.g., Leonor Vivanco, Number of Chicago Taxi Drivers Hits 10-Year Low as Ride-Share 
Companies Take Off, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 17, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-
taxi-driver-decline-met-20161214-story.html [https://perma.cc/3XW7-2F54]. 
 67 GEN RE, LIFE & HEALTH FACT BOOK, 2015-2016, supra note 46, at 50. 
 68 See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST, supra note 38. 
 69 In 1975, approximately 39% of private sector workers in the United States participated in 
defined benefit plans. Data for early years is not available, but the total fraction of U.S. private 
sector workers participating in any pension plan (defined benefit or not) did not exceed one half 
prior to 1975. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FACTS FROM EBRI: U.S. RETIREMENT INCOME 
SYSTEM 5 (1998), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/1298fact.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W6V-
QG8D]. 
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not to glorify the state of pooling in the past. In theory, workplace-based 
risk pooling can mitigate problems of moral hazard and (especially) 
adverse selection that plague individual insurance markets; in practice, 
workplace-based risk pooling has always left a large segment of the U.S. 
population unpooled. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF POOLING 
So far, this article has highlighted the ways in which workplaces 
can serve as sites of risk pooling—and ways in which workplaces 
oftentimes do not perform that function. This last part considers the 
ways in which risk pooling might continue to occur notwithstanding the 
rise of Uber and nonemployer firms more generally. 
One possibility is that workers will value pooling so much that 
firms like Uber and Lyft—or their competitors—will realize that they 
can do better (i.e., can attract more skilled/competent workers and/or 
can save by cutting cash compensation) if they establish workplace-
based risk pools of their own. The founder of Juno, a ridesharing 
platform with nearly 13,000 drivers in New York City as of August 
2016, has spoken about making its drivers employees rather than 
independent contractors and offering benefits.70 So far, however, Juno’s 
most significant moves away from Uber’s compensation model have 
come in the form of lower commissions, optional tipping through the 
Juno app, and the company’s decision to set aside shares of restricted 
stock for drivers.71 Employee stock ownership is a far cry from risk 
pooling—indeed, it is the opposite of risk pooling in that leaves 
employees even more exposed to the risk that their employer will fail 
(because firm failure will then result in the employee losing not only 
her job but also her savings).72 
An obstacle to workplace-based risk pooling is the fact that most of 
the associated tax advantages depend on workers qualifying as 
“employees.”73 Although the tax law test for whether a worker is an 
 
 70 Aarti Shahani, Uber Competitor In NYC Promises Drivers Benefits, Even Employee Status, 
NPR (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/08/22/490655700/uber-
competitor-in-nyc-promises-drivers-benefits-even-employee-status [https://perma.cc/32BE-W94Y]. 
 71 See Claire Martin, Granting Shares for Fares: An Uber Rival’s Play for Drivers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/technology/granting-shares-for-fares-an-uber-
rivals-play-for-drivers.html [https://perma.cc/7RXH-3PWS]. 
 72 For a thoughtful discussion of the relationship between employee ownership and risk 
bearing, see Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, 
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1772–73 (1990). 
 73 See 26 U.S.C. § 79(a) (2012) (exclusion from “gross income of an employee” for employer-paid 
premiums on up to $50,000 of group term life insurance); 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2012) (“gross income 
of an employee does not include employer-provided coverage under an accident or health plan”); 26 
U.S.C. § 125(d)(1) (2012) (all participants in “cafeteria plan” must be “employees”). 
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“employee” is not the same as the test under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA),74 actions that increase the likelihood of a worker being 
classified as an employee for income tax purposes might also militate in 
favor of employee classification for FLSA purposes (e.g., setting hours 
for work; requiring the worker to work full time; paying the worker by 
the hour, week, or month).75 Firms may rightly fear that making a 
worker an employee for tax purposes will trigger the application of 
FLSA’s minimum hourly wage and overtime pay requirements. 
Likewise, firms may be concerned that steps toward qualifying workers 
as employees for tax purposes will increase tort liability exposure under 
the doctrine of respondeat superior.76 
Lawmakers might encourage workplace-based risk pooling by 
allowing firms to classify workers as employees for federal income tax 
purposes without triggering employee classification for FLSA and other 
labor law purposes. A firm like Uber, then, would be able to contribute 
to drivers’ health insurance and disability insurance, and to offer 
drivers life insurance coverage of up to $50,000, without triggering any 
inclusion of income for the employee. Note, though, that there are costs 
as well as benefits to this approach. Most significantly, any change that 
confers tax benefits on Uber drivers will also lead to a loss of revenue 
for the fisc. It is not obvious that the risk spreading benefits are worth 
the tax dollars that would have to be sacrificed. 
Furthermore, while the federal tax system provides benefits for 
workplace-based risk pooling among employees, employee status for 
Uber drivers and other currently self-employed individuals would come 
with tax disadvantages as well. One tax disadvantage of employee 
status is the fact that employees who opt for the standard deduction on 
their individual income tax returns cannot claim a deduction for 
unreimbursed employee business expenses.77 And even for taxpayers 
who opt to itemize their deductions, employee status comes with a cost: 
unreimbursed business expenses below 2% of adjusted gross income 
cannot be deducted on one’s individual income tax return.78 So long as 
gig economy workers are paying a large share of business expenses out 
 
 74 See Charles J. Muhl, What Is an Employee? The Answer Depends on Federal Law, MONTHLY 
LABOR REV. (Jan. 2002), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/01/art1full.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF 
X4-5YAA]. 
 75 The IRS has set forth a 20-factor test for whether a worker is an employee or an independent 
contractor. See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. 
 76 Cf. Maria Dinzeo, Uber Says It’s Not Liable for Drivers’ Misdeeds, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. 
(Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.courthousenews.com/2016/04/01/uber-says-its-not-liable-for-drivers-
misdeeds.htm [https://perma.cc/NV6J-5BRZ] (noting Uber’s efforts to escape liability for driver’s 
on-the-job conduct). 
 77 See 26 U.S.C. § 62(a)(1) (2012). 
 78 26 U.S.C. § 67 (2012). 
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of pocket, the pooling-related tax benefits of employee classification 
might not be worth the unfavorable treatment of expenses that comes 
with it. 
Moreover, whether platforms like Uber and Lyft begin to facilitate 
workplace-based risk pooling, these pools will still leave out non-
employee workers who are not platform participants: construction 
laborers, landscapers, fitness trainers, therapists in solo practice, and 
millions of others.79 Organizations such as the Freelancers Union have 
sought to pool these “independent workers” to purchase health, life, and 
disability insurance, and to enroll in a defined contribution 401(k) 
plan.80 But while the Freelancers Union and similar organizations 
certainly can play an important role in providing information to 
independent workers regarding individual insurance market offerings, 
the voluntary association model is unlikely to mitigate the adverse 
selection problems endemic to individual insurance markets. If, for 
example, the Freelancers Union offers generous life insurance or 
disability insurance benefits to members who procure insurance 
through the organization, then individuals with high mortality or 
disability risks will select into those benefits. It is hard to see how the 
voluntary association model might give rise to risk pools that 
encompass both high-risk and low-risk individuals. 
Probably the most straightforward way to establish pools that 
encompass high risk and low risk individuals is for the government to 
do so itself. And, indeed, federal programs already play an important 
role in pooling health risk, longevity risk, mortality risk, disability risk, 
and productivity risk.81 Medicare and Medicaid facilitate the pooling of 
health risk among covered individuals (in particular, senior citizens and 
low income households). Social Security insures workers against 
longevity risk by providing monthly payments from retirement age 
until death. Social Security further provides insurance against 
mortality risk through a system of survivor benefits, and against 
disability risk by providing income supplements for individuals under 
retirement age who become unable to work. Meanwhile, a progressive 
income tax rate structure, coupled with income security programs such 
 
 79 On the size and composition of the self-employed workforce, see Justin Fox, Where Are All 
the Self-Employed Workers?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 7, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/02/where-are-all-
the-self-employed-workers [https://perma.cc/3Y8G-9MP6]. 
 80 See generally Benefits, FREELANCERS UNION, https://www.freelancersunion.org/benefits/ 
[https://perma.cc/V8LX-45KT] (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
 81 Safety net programs arguably insure against mortality risk as well by dampening the 
consumption shock that a spouse, dependent, or child will experience when an income-earning 
household member dies prematurely. 
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as the Earned Income Tax Credit, buffers households against 
consumption shocks when a breadwinner’s productivity declines.82 
Yet Social Security was never intended to be the only mechanism 
by which workers would insure against longevity risk, mortality risk, 
or disability risk.83 Meanwhile, Medicare, Medicaid, and other public 
programs provide health insurance to only 36% of the U.S. population.84 
And the Earned Income Tax Credit was explicitly designed not to 
provide a catch-all safety net for workers edged out of the labor force.85 
Asking these programs to serve as substitutes for workplace-based risk 
pools is asking them to perform a function for which they are ill-
designed. 
From the observations above, one might draw out an argument for 
the public sector to play the risk pooling role at which gig economy firms 
like Uber are failing. It would be a surprise to all, though, if President 
Trump and a Republican-led Congress catalyze a change in that 
direction. If the public sector’s risk pooling role is to expand in the 
second half of the 21st century’s second decade, then that change will 
almost certainly have to come from a level of government other than the 
federal. 
State-level risk pooling is not unprecedented. Massachusetts’s 
“Romneycare” experience is perhaps the most prominent recent 
example,86 and the Social Security Act of 1935 drew lessons from a more 
modest unemployment insurance scheme implemented by the state of 
Wisconsin three years earlier.87 A full treatment of state-based risk 
pooling lies well beyond the space limits of this article and the scope of 
this symposium. The notion that states might serve as sites for broader 
risk pooling is, however, a possibility worth exploring in further depth. 
 
 82 See Hal R. Varian, Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance, 14 J. PUB. ECON. 49 (1980). 
 83 See generally Larry DeWitt, Research Note #1: Origins of the Three-Legged Stool Metaphor 
for Social Security, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (May 1996), https://www.ssa.gov/history/stool.html [https:// 
perma.cc/Z3K5-N8FW]. 
 84 HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE OF THE TOTAL 
POPULATION, http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?currentTimeframe=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/PC54-G6FA] (last visited Dec. 28, 2016). 
 85 See V. Joseph Hotz & John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit, in MEANS-TESTED 
TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 141, 142 (Robert A. Moffitt ed., 2003) (noting that 
“[t]he credit began as part of a broader effort by Senator Russell Long (Dem.-La.) to derail 
congressional and presidential interest in a negative income tax”). 
 86 See, e.g., Michael T. Doonan & Katharine R. Tull, Health Care Reform in Massachusetts: 
Implementation of Coverage Expansions and a Health Insurance Mandate, 88 MILBANK Q. 54 
(2010). 
 87 On the Wisconsin experience, see G. John Ikenberry & Theda Skocpol, Expanding Social 
Benefits: The Role of Social Security, 102 POL. SCI. Q. 389 (1987). 
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Yet a state-based patchwork of risk pools would no doubt leave 
large swaths of America unpooled. State-based risk sharing might be 
politically plausible in Oregon or Vermont; it is less so in, say, 
Oklahoma or Wyoming. Perhaps Blue States can serve as laboratories 
of democracy that demonstrate the plausibility of public-sponsored 
pools, just as Wisconsin and Massachusetts did in earlier eras, with the 
result that the federal government adopts a similar program 
nationwide. But it will take a President and a Congress much more 
amenable to new safety net programs before any such scheme is 
implemented nationally. 
In the meantime, we can expect that workplace-based pooling will 
remain the primary mechanism for risk-sharing across high-risk and 
low-risk individuals outside the limited confines of Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid. Meanwhile, millions of workers without 
traditional employers, hundreds of thousands of whom toil in the 
growing gig economy, will remain unpooled—unable to insure 
themselves against health risk, longevity risk, mortality risk, disability 
risk, and productivity risk except through adverse selection-prone 
individual insurance markets. What has come to be called the “sharing 
economy”88 might be better described as a “go-it-alone economy,” in 
which risks are individualized and workers go unpooled. The paradigm 
of workplace-based risk pooling might not have been perfectly equipped 
for any era, but it seems particularly ill-equipped for the Uber era. As 
Uber announces the arrival of a “brave new world,”89 its workers are left 
to brave that world by themselves. 
 
 
 88 See, e.g., The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.econ 
omist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy [https://perma. 
cc/4JCA-4P8S]; see also ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT 
AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM (2016). On the inaccuracy of the name “sharing 
economy,” see Steven Greenhouse, Editorial, The Whatchamacallit Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/the-whatchamacallit-economy.html [https:// 
perma.cc/56XR-ZT53]. 
 89 See supra note 1. 
